CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE EIGHT HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 March 1999, at 10.15 a.m.

President: Mr. Nguyen Quy Binh (Viet Nam)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 819th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Allow me first, on behalf of all of us, to express our deep gratitude and appreciation to my predecessor, Ambassador Rodríguez Cedeño of Venezuela, who is absent today, for his relentless energy and diligence to conduct intensive consultations, and for his skilful and untiring efforts aimed at translating the agenda into a programme of work. I am also very grateful to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the CD, and to all the other staff of the secretariat for their able and indispensable support.

The immediate task we are faced with continues to be the one my two predecessors have been trying to resolve, namely, to develop consensus on the programme of work of the Conference. I hardly need to stress that we are about to conclude the first part of our annual session and go into a recess without having yet found an acceptable basis on which to start our substantive work. Therefore, determined efforts are urgently needed on the part of all of us to resolve the differences on the two outstanding issues, nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this regard, I can only reiterate what my predecessors said. There are a number of proposals on the table as to how to deal with those issues. Attempts were made by my predecessors to find compromise solutions to these issues. What is now required is for all of us to display the necessary flexibility which will allow us to move forward.

For my part, I have already embarked on a series of bilateral consultations with a view to ascertaining where we stand on these two issues, and exploring possible ways and means of promoting early consensus. I wish to assure you that I shall devote my full energy and attention to our common endeavour, particularly with regard to the achievement of a consensus programme of work that would enable us to move to substantive discussions. I am confident that political will and flexibility will enable us to build the necessary consensus to adopt our programme of work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Iraq and Canada. I should like to give the floor to the representative of Iraq, Mr. Ahmed Al-Awad.

Mr. AL-AWAD (Iraq) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, my delegation has pleasure in extending to you our congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its 1999 session. I am confident that your skills and your experience will greatly contribute to rendering the work of this session successful. My delegation also wishes to thank the Permanent Representative of Venezuela who spared no effort to make our work successful. I would also like to thank the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and his deputy for their considerable efforts to ensure that our work achieved its objectives.

(Mr. Al-Awad, Iraq)

The task of disarmament which our Conference is shouldering is a lofty task. Open-mindedness always allows us to achieve more in this prominent international forum in which the international community has placed its trust. As you are aware, Mr. President, important and sensitive issues, such as the question of disarmament, require thorough familiarity with the positions and viewpoints of States, which sometimes might differ greatly. In this regard, the role of this Conference is to reconcile viewpoints and create a single harmonized position that will lead to the adoption of practical and objective decisions that can be implemented.

The concerns of the delegations participating in this Conference, which those delegations express in their national statements, are certainly of great importance. Although we are hopeful that it will be possible to achieve all the objectives sought, there are some priorities in our current world that cannot be disregarded or deferred because they constitute a common and urgent objective for a large number of States. Nuclear disarmament is one of the highest priorities.

We are living today in the age of nuclear discrimination because there are States that are permitted to retain massive arsenals of nuclear weapons while other States are stripped of all nuclear materials, even those which are used for peaceful purposes. The selective approach to this issue engenders a deep sense of frustration and diverts us from our primary objective. Nuclear disarmament is the kingpin of our endeavours to strengthen international security, improve mutual relations and build confidence among States. It is also a firm guarantee that future generations will be able to live in a safe world free from fear. No convention or treaty in this respect will achieve its global and regional objectives unless it is accepted by all the parties thereto.

The proper procedure for the implementation of international treaties and conventions in the field of disarmament should begin with a clear recognition of their benefits by the States and the parties concerned. Furthermore, their application in a comprehensive manner would create an appropriate climate conducive to disarmament and the cause of international peace and security. We are all aware that it is not easy to combine differing viewpoints in a single package, but when we recall the current nuclear arms race and the massive stockpiles of nuclear arsenals with all the dangers that they entail, this should induce us to appeal to the international forums specialized in the field of disarmament to place this issue on their list of priorities and to apply its criteria thereto in a comprehensive manner and without any exception.

The international community today stands perplexed, seeking reasonable justifications or objective reasons to explain why, despite numerous appeals from the international community, the Zionist entity has for 18 years disregarded Security Council resolution 487 (1981), which called upon it to subject its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards regime of IAEA, and has also, for eight years, disregarded paragraph 14 of resolution 687 (1991), which sought to turn the Middle East into a zone free

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of weapons of mass destruction. The forthcoming 2000 NPT Review Conference should address this question in a serious and clear manner and devise practical solutions thereto.

The serious dangers that are threatening our world today stem mainly from the existence of arsenals and components of nuclear weapons. Our awareness of this fact is not based solely on theoretical premises because we could cite hundreds of cases of cancerous diseases and congenital malformations among innocent Iraqi citizens which resulted from the use of depleted uranium shells against Iraq in 1991. Had it not been for the illegal air embargo imposed on Iraq, it would have been possible for us to give you a living example that would provide an adequate illustration of the effects of the use of such abominable weapons without any sense of legal or moral responsibility. We therefore appeal to the Conference to take practical and serious steps to conclude a binding international agreement prohibiting the use of nuclear-weapon components and other nuclear derivatives such as depleted uranium in conventional weapons.

Disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, can be achieved only through the creation of a general awareness of its real benefits and a clear recognition of those benefits, followed by the adoption of serious and programmed measures in accordance with a clearly defined time-frame and clear objectives under the supervision of an international forum and also in accordance with comprehensive and non-selective implementation criteria for a binding international instrument. Then, and only then, will we have taken the right step towards disarmament, because we will have provided equal opportunities for all States to further their national aims while, at the same time, consolidating peace and security in this world.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Iraq for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair, and give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Moher.

Mr. MOHER (Canada): First of all, Mr. President, we would obviously like to welcome you to the presidency of this Conference and certainly pledge to do our best to cooperate with you in our effort to move forward the work of this Conference. I would also like to put on record Canada's appreciation for the efforts by your predecessor, Ambassador Rodríguez of Venezuela, for the work that he put into his presidency and to the cooperation which he demonstrated with Canada and with others.

Before going forward with our statement on the prospective negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, there are three preliminary observations of a general nature that Canada would like to make this morning. First, Canadian priorities for the CD have been clearly stated earlier, for example, our plenary statement of 4 February; those four priorities are nuclear disarmament, fissile material, the non-weaponization of outer space, and small arms - light weapons; each in our view provides promising areas for us to work on. Second in identifying those priorities, we have acknowledged that the degree of consensus on each varies in this Conference; we have accordingly

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

accepted different approaches while advocating that all be addressed. Third, while an agreed programme of work including all of these is our preference, Canada has not made agreement on that requirement; we have stated, and renew again today, our willingness to begin work on these issues which are now - immediately - available for work, while continuing to pursue agreement on others.

Now these comments are in a sense redundant, Mr. President, and I apologize for having to make them, but we have had a number of inquiries recently from outside this room alleging that Canada is one of the difficulties that you are facing, and I wanted to make clear that that is not the case.

Negotiations on fissile material: we wish to emphasize first of all our regret that we are not in a position to address today a re-established ad hoc committee formally tasked to negotiate. We renew our plea for immediate action in that regard. At the same time, we want to move substantive consideration of this issue forward. We have listened carefully to and thoroughly evaluated statements already made inter alia by Egypt, Pakistan, the United States of America, Norway and Japan. We have also reflected on views put forward at various seminars and workshops, documents on two of which we are helping to distribute to all members of this Conference this week. Our statement today is intended to reflect these evaluations and reflections - and hopefully to contribute to substantive forward movement on this key theme in actual negotiations as soon as possible. Those negotiations will be politically and technically complex and demanding; only a disciplined, focused approach by all will enable us to reach agreement on a viable, a credible and an effective treaty.

Canada has been one of the strongest supporters of such a treaty for approximately half a century. In doing so, while the central objective has remained constant - i.e. a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices - the definitions of the context and the associated challenges have evolved over the decades. In 1978, for example, the then Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau addressed the concept within his "strategy of suffocation" concept at a time when weapons and stockpile inventories were increasing dramatically. In 1999, we are in a period of weapons reductions which has resulted in significant excess stocks of both a qualitatively and quantitatively different context.

The most recent comprehensive multilateral effort to capture this new context and its implications was the Shannon report of 1995. But that report, while it successfully bridged differences and articulated a mandate within a context, did not resolve a number of essential difficulties. That remains the mandate of our ad hoc committee, i.e. to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In pursuing that mandate we will have to seek consensus on the context within which we are working as well as on the specific dimensions of the treaty itself.

(Mr. Moher, Canada)

As forecast in our general statement on 4 February of this year and building, inter alia, on our plenary statement of 11 August of last year, we wish to begin to address these considerations, context and specifics in this intervention today. We will do so in the following areas: first, what we call critical "conceptual parameters" for the negotiations; second, specific "strategic issues" which will need to be addressed in those negotiations; and third, some specific "structural questions" which will need to be resolved. Obviously, Canadian participation in the detailed negotiations will be guided by these perceptions on our part.

First, conceptual parameters: The negotiation of any disarmament, non-proliferation or arms control treaty must reflect the overall security content in which that negotiation is taking place, must respond to relevant challenges (existing and foreseen), and must take into account certain political realities. Our decisions, nationally and collectively, as to whether or not to conclude such negotiations and to sign/ratify the result will depend on our assessments as to how these three considerations are addressed. It may therefore be valuable to share with this Committee certain key "conceptual parameters" that Canada will be bearing in mind. Certain key "conceptual parameters" will be significant, relevant to Canada in this regard.

First, an eventual treaty will need to address both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation concerns. In so doing it must, like the CTBT, reinforce the international regime anchored in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Such treaties, which are by definition "focus" or "issue-specific" treaties, cannot be alternatives to that regime - or substitutes.

As stated last August, Canada is not prepared to see the almost unanimously supported international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the NPT redefined through these negotiations. This basic principle will have implications throughout our new treaty - on scope, on verification and on structural or mechanism provisions. But the most important will be its significance for the provisions of the treaty dealing with potential States parties, their status, their commitments and their obligations.

This treaty should not change or redefine certain key political and legal principles. Canada's "nuclear world", for example, is defined by the NPT with its five nuclear-weapon States, its 182 non-nuclear-weapon States and those few States with are not yet States parties. This "nuclear world" will need to be reflected in our treaty; we are not prepared to redefine that world by assigning to any State any newly minted political-legal status. This will not be an easy or simple task. Canada has begun its detailed study of possible solutions to this challenge and looks forward to exchanges of views with others as to how it can be most positively overcome.

Second, the undeniable question of existing stocks. Undeniable in the sense that stocks - obviously - exist. And also undeniable since the Shannon report itself acknowledges "that the mandate for the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee does not preclude any delegation from raising for

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consideration in the Ad Hoc Committee any of the above-noted issues", including - obviously - stocks. We have listed carefully, as I said earlier, to the views and conclusions put forward in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee in 1998 or in the CD plenary and in various workshops and seminars.

Certainly there can be no doubt as to the relevance of the fact that as of the end of 1997 at least 250 tons of plutonium and 1,700 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) existed in fissile material stockpiles available for weapons purposes. While certain steps to reduce those stockpiles by the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom are welcome, much more remains to be done. Even using the IAEA "significant quantity" of 8 kilograms for plutonium, the reality is that 250 tons equates to approximately 31,000 warheads. For HEU, using 25 kilograms as a "significant quantity", 1,700 tons equates to 68,000 warheads. Asking the international community to ignore that reality and to focus exclusively on future production will be difficult to understand or to accept.

At the same time, the five nuclear-weapon States have repeatedly and forcefully stated that they will not agree to the inclusion of stockpile issues in the negotiation of a multilateral treaty in the CD. If that assertion on their part is accepted as a "bottom line" in our negotiations, that will establish another reality which will have to be acknowledged and reconciled if we are to achieve a treaty.

How can that be done? Canada has decided that its approach will be guided by the following: while we will not argue that stockpiles be addressed in the treaty itself, it will be vital that in parallel with its negotiation all States with stockpiles engage in measures (national, bilateral, multilateral) to enhance transparency and to reduce those stockpiles irreversibly. The Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes, signed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin on 2 September 1998, is an example of one such measure that could meet these ends once implemented. We also have noted the earlier expressions by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in January 1994 that they would "cooperate with each other and also with other States to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excess stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks".

A verifiable ban on production would be an important increment to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, but without meaningful parallel measures on stockpiles. Canada questions whether a ban of this nature will be as viable, as credible and as effective as it might be.

In line with the NPT and in the worked of the 1995 "Principles and objectives" decision, Canada has long demanded and will continue to demand "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons ...". We can hardly do less as regards stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. And we serve notice now - our evaluation of the credibility and the effectiveness of any eventual treaty text will be heavily influenced by progress made in this regard.

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To facilitate a clear understanding of what Canada considers to be necessary in this respect, we are circulating a working paper entitled: "Elements of an approach to dealing with stocks of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices"; this paper is to be an official document of this Conference.

A third conceptual parameter is directly related to the point just addressed. Canada's understanding is that the five nuclear-weapon States have already ceased production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes.

We welcome this and other parallel measures - as we do the future contribution of an FMCT to confirming this cessation in a legally binding, effectively verified way. What we cannot welcome is the inability of the five States concerned to confirm their cessation of production through formal moratorium commitments. The arguments for not doing so and the linkage made by some of those States between their positions and the behaviour of other States is difficult to understand given the size of their existing weapons and fissile material stockpiles.

The international community through the CD mechanism is launching complex negotiations; they will undoubtedly be time-consuming as well. The conceptual contradiction of us all working strenuously to achieve a ban on production while one, two or more States continue busily engaged in production is surely self-evident. Canada renews it call for a comprehensive moratorium by all the States concerned, with the five nuclear-weapon States exercising the necessary political and moral leadership.

In addition to these three conceptual parameters, others could be cited and developed. However, suffice it to state at this point that these three occupy a defining position for Canada as we begin these detailed negotiations. We will return to them frequently as our work progresses.

Turning now to strategic issues, the list of "strategic issues" which we could collectively or will collectively have to confront is itself lengthy and filled with definitional and political-technological problems. We cannot address them all in this initial statement. Indeed some of these issues are sequential in nature, taking on additional difficulty and complexity as earlier decisions are taken. We will therefore limit ourselves now to two or three basic observations.

First, what fissile materials and what facilities? In our view the treaty must deal with weapons-usable fissile material, not just weapons-grade fissile material. The incongruity of a potential situation in which IAEA safeguards weapons-usable material in 182 non-nuclear-weapon States, while an FMCT deals only with weapons-grade fissile material in the nuclear-weapon or other States, must be recognized. Provision should also be made for including other fissile material (e.g. neptunium) under the treaty if and when considered necessary. Tritium is not a fissile material and should not be included.

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And while the focus should be on the classical production facilities - enrichment and reprocessing - we will want to ensure that other production technologies and facilities as well as facilities that might be associated with new produced fissile material are adequately covered by the treaty.

A very significant complication in this regard will be the issue of fissile material for military non-explosive uses. We agree that the treaty should provide for such uses, and for the production of such material in the future if necessary. But great care will be necessary to ensure that this flexibility does not open the door to production or stockage measures which would in effect dilute or defeat the treaty's desired impact. Transparency, confidence-building and verification measures will all need to be developed with this concern in mind.

The challenge of developing a "non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty" is evident to us all. But some key factors as regards verification can and should be flagged early. First, any verification regime, if it is to be effective, must deal with both declared and undeclared fissile material as well as production and other relevant facilities. The implementation of this principle will raise many issues, not least of all in the nuclear-weapon States where inter alia specific steps for enhanced transparency and a clear baseline for a verification regime will have to be established.

Second, based on some of the conceptual parameters developed earlier, Canada considers that the treaty's verification regime, as it applies to States that have in force the IAEA agreements pursuant to both INFCIRC/153 and INFCIRC/540, must be rooted in those agreements. While it may be considered desirable in the course of our negotiations to supplement that framework, deliberately and prudently, we will need to exercise great care not to call into question the integrity of the enhanced IAEA safeguards regime.

Third, any effective verification regime, which will be applied in States not parties to the framework just outlined, must be appropriately comprehensive and satisfy similar concerns as to the thoroughness and "reasonable assurances". The starting point, the end point and specific provisions of such a regime will therefore need to be carefully negotiated.

This brief overview of scope and verification concerns indicates Canada's starting points as we begin to engage in these negotiations. It hints at only some of the real difficulties before us. But early recognition of and thoughts given to these factors will, we believe, facilitate the negotiations themselves.

Finally, turning to structural questions, many questions will have to be addressed in detail later in the negotiations. At the same time, some early considerations can be noted. First, governance: as with other treaties, we are of the view that separate governance mechanisms sensitive to the scope, obligations, operational factors and adherence to this treaty will need to be

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developed. Second, the verification mechanism: given our earlier observations, it is evident that Canada considers IAEA, given its existing and experienced safeguards system, to be the essential foundation for any verification mechanism. Third, financial provisions: while there is a collective responsibility as regards this treaty, consideration will need to be given to an appropriately weighted and defined financial mechanism. Fourth, entry into force: given out views on entry-into-force provisions of other treaties, such as the CTBT, Canada will be most sensitive to this provision, particularly in light of some of the conceptual concerns identified earlier. Other "structural" issues such as amendment, protocols, dispute settlement and compliance will obviously arise as we go forward.

In conclusion, this intervention on our part has been somewhat detailed, and as I mentioned at the beginning, we would very much have preferred to have been able to give it at a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee itself. We have however set forward these views, given our strong commitment to the achievement of a viable, effective and credible treaty which must reinforce the international nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. To that end, we look forward to participating in and contributing constructively to a responsible, serious negotiation process in the very near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Canada for his comprehensive statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor? The Ambassador of Pakistan has the floor.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, it is a pleasant opportunity to be able to extend our warm congratulations to you on having assumed the presidency of the Conference at this important moment of our work. I would also wish to extend my gratitude and appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela, for the diligence and integrity with which he conducted his task.

It was not the intention of my delegation to seek the floor today, but I can rarely resist the temptation to respond to my distinguished colleague from Canada, especially on the issue of fissile materials. My delegation had the opportunity at our last session in 1998 to outline our general approach and some of our considerations with regard to the fissile materials treaty. Earlier in this session, my delegation stated that we would take an early opportunity to respond to some of the views and positions which have been expressed here by some of our colleagues on the fissile materials treaty. Canada's statement adds to the list of those issues which will require such comments and on which, we believe, the Conference will need to conduct pre-negotiations before it can proceed to the actual stage of negotiations in the concept which Canada had earlier outlined for the work of this Conference.

Let me just use this opportunity, however, to make certain general and political points with regard to the fissile materials treaty, since many of us seem to getting ahead of ourselves. First of all, let me say that the nuclear world, as conceived by Canada - that is, consisting of five nuclear-weapon

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States - is not the real world. It is an unreal world and it denies the realities on the ground in many cases. What is more, it is proposed to conclude a universal treaty, but to base that treaty on a world that is legislated in one particular treaty. For Pakistan, the negotiations on the fissile materials will be completely *de nouveau* negotiations. We do not accept that there are five nuclear-weapon States. This is a factual incorrectness. The distinguished Ambassador of Canada has argued on the one hand that we cannot change the NPT because that has been accepted by 182 non-nuclear-weapon States, but thereafter, he also argued that there is another reality which will have to be acknowledged and reconciled if we are to achieve a treaty, which is that the P-5 will not accept the negotiation of the existing stockpiles in this treaty. The two positions are contradictory and incompatible.

We cannot accept a situation where a treaty such as this would freeze the inequality that exists not only globally but also in certain sensitive regions of the world. The proposal for a moratorium suffers principally from this defect. If certain States have security requirements, so do others. The second recommendation by Canada says that all five nuclear-weapon States should assess their nuclear weapons requirements and declare appropriate amounts of fissile materials to be in excess. If the five nuclear-weapon States have the right to assess their nuclear weapons requirements, why should others not have the same right, if they are placed in similar situations as the nuclear-weapons States? Why should a moratorium or a treaty ban production at levels which will clearly discriminate against some States which feel they do not have the requirements they need for effective deterrence? A moratorium would also be unverifiable, and the treaty's mandate specifically states that the treaty has to be universal, has to be non-discriminatory and has to be internationally verifiable. A moratorium cannot match those criteria.

Finally, the concept of what is to be banned or not banned will have to be determined from the viewpoint of this treaty, not what is placed under IAEA safeguards, because IAEA safeguards are conceived in the context of the NPT. This treaty's safeguards will have to relate to the obligations undertaken under this treaty, not under the NPT.

And by the same token, we believe that IAEA does not have an automatic role to play in the verification of this treaty. Verification of this treaty will have to be specific to this treaty, and that will be determined by what we agree to ban under this treaty - future production, existing stockpiles, future production of what? Will production be continued under certain circumstances? All these are issues that require clarification and agreement in the negotiations.

It is true - and I agree with my distinguished colleague from Canada - that the negotiation of this treaty will be complex and difficult. It will be complex and difficult because the issues involved are complex. But it will also be complex so long as certain States continue to insist that this treaty will be discriminatory, whereas it is declared that it should not be discriminatory. Exceptions for the P-5, exceptions for certain countries in

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stocks and not for others, existence of unequal stockpiles - these are all issues that will add to complexity because they are politically unfair and discriminatory.

My delegation would like all these issues to be clarified and considered in this Conference when we start our negotiations. Unless these issues are clarified, we will not be able to move into the stage of actually elaborating a treaty, because there is no agreement as yet on the premises of the treaty, on what is universal, what is non-discriminatory and what is effectively verifiable. So let us not get ahead of ourselves and make assertions on the basis of preconceived notions. We need much greater and in-depth discussion of the issues, clarification of issues, before we can get to that stage. My delegation is ready for this stage. We shall take an early opportunity to elaborate our views on the specifics of this treaty, and we look forward to engaging in a constructive and in-depth dialogue with all interested delegations, including the delegation of Canada.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Ambassador of Pakistan for his statement. Are there other delegations that would like to take the floor? I see none.

So that concludes the list of speakers for today. With regard to the programme of meetings for next week, as I already indicated at the Presidential consultations held yesterday with the Group Coordinators, we shall hold plenary meetings on Tuesday, 23 March, at 10 a.m., at which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland will address the Conference; on Thursday, 25 March, also at 10 a.m., at which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Mexico and the Commissioner of the Federal Government for Disarmament and Arms Control of Germany will address the Conference; and on Friday, 26 March, at 3.30 p.m., which will be addressed by the President of the People's Republic of China. So next week - and I say it again - we have three plenary meetings.

This concludes our business for today. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 23 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.